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DIVINE ILLUSIONS
ALPHONSO LINGIS
David Allison says to his readers that Nietzsche writes for you — you and him
and me. In his book he tells of what of Nietzsche’s thoughts he has, with long
years of research and penetrating and generous reflection, made his own. The
lucidity of this book enables us to see if these thoughts can also become ours.
Nietzsche’s thoughts are not only extremely complex but hard thoughts which
we cannot make our own without a struggle. The finest virtue of a
philosophical book on Nietzsche is that it provokes this struggle. Here I am
only going to recount a little of my struggle with a couple of those thoughts,
in the expectation that David Allison will shed more light on them.
Nietzsche’s insists on the illusory nature of art. Apollonian art — plastic
art, poetry, sculpture, and architecture — is the art of forms, perfect, selfcontained, radiant forms. They are created not through observation and
technique but out of visions and dreams. Apollonian art is as natural to us as
the faculty in our minds that dreams. Apollonian artworks are public dreams.
And the bliss they produce is the very bliss of dreams: it is that of the
hypnogogic state in which the dreamer recognizes that what he sees is a dream,
but says: “It is a dream! I will dream on!” The artist willingly cuts himself free
from realism and reality, to project himself into dreams, into illusions.
Nietzsche then declares that illusions are the only justification of life. What
can this justification then be? Could this be anything but an illusory
justification? David Allison says that they make “existence itself seem
estimable and fully worthy of being lived.” But one has to live in reality, a
reality where there is no remedy for death, where no progress is assured,
indeed where, science will finally show, there are no goals and no purposes.
Neither the dreamer who dreams up castles in Spain, nor the artist who creates
the radiant images of the Homeric epics and the anthro-pomorphic deities
erected on the Acropolis changes anything in the needy, vulner-able, and
mortal life he lives stuck in purposeless reality. They nowise make of the life
of the artist himself an artwork. Nietzsche, in The Genealogy of Morals,
observes that artists have always shown themselves to be the weakest and most
servile of men, readily subjecting their work to serve political, moral, and
religious doctrines.1
If the Apollonian illusions cannot make just, make right the harsh
necessities and harsh inevitabilities of the real world, could they not serve to
transfigure pain, loss, vulnerability, oppression, enslavement, and mortality
into something grand and thus make the absurd comic, the terrible awesome?
Contemplating the destruction of one’s own form of life and identity from a
distance, illuminated by the Apollonian light, could we not find a certain
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resignation in our tragic existence? Could we not come to see the ingenious
microbes or voracious cancer that destroys us with a certain detached
admiration?
Nietzsche had written that the anthropomorphic Greek gods — who embody
all human rages, jealousies, aggressions, vindictiveness, lusts, and
debaucheries — represent the sole way gods can justify our existence — by
living it themselves, in a guiltless and magnified form. But we do not just
contemplate them from here below; through art we project ourselves into the
divine.
Alongside of Apollonian art there is Dionysian, born of music and dance.
Music, which conveys no instruction, and dance, which is pleasure in
movement that is not going any where, do not detach themselves from the real
universe of tragic fatalism or the scientific universe devoid of purpose or goal.
Here there is no longer a separation of the artwork from the real artist; music
and dance are made with the flesh and body of the artist himself.
Dionysian and Apollonian art culminated in Greek tragedy. Greek tragedy
did not teach an explanation of the world; instead it produced effects; it
produced a transformative experience in the participants.
The abandon to music and dance produces visions, Apollonian visions.
These now are not contemplated apart from the visionary; they possess him
and he enacts them. The actor in tragic theater — and every participant was
an actor — projects himself entirely into a heroic role; he is someone
possessed. He is nothing but a churning excess of vital energies taking on a
form, crafting that form to perfection, and then leading it to its death. But this
death is not abject, for the actor knows himself capable of creating this hero
and this heroic destiny once more another night, knows himself capable of
creating innumerable heros and heroic destinies and leading them to their
sublime and glorious deaths. Thus he experiences, beneath the creation and
destruction of forms, a fund of vital energies that is capable of creating
innumerable forms and is nowise diminished by the destruction of those forms.
In this the actor finds himself in deep contact with the world-force itself, which
creates innumerable forms and wills none of them to survive. In tragic theater,
“while [the] attitude [of the chorus] toward the god is wholly one of service,
it is nevertheless the highest, namely the Dionysian expression of nature and
therefore pronounces in its rapture, as nature does, oracles and wise saying:
sharing his suffering it also shares something of his wisdom and proclaims the
truth from the heart of the world.” Thus Nietzsche connects the exultation of
the actor with a rapture in nature itself to find in tragic theater a metaphysical
consolation — consolation for our pain and our mortality.
In fact in seeking at the last limits of the destructive an aesthetic
justification, Nietzsche sought a justification for all events in the world.
“What does joy not want?” exults Zarathustra. “It wants love, it wants hatred,
it is overrich, gives, throws away, begs that one might take it, thanks the taker,
it would like to be hated; so rich is joy that it thirsts for woe, for hell, for
hatred, for disgrace, for the cripple, for world — this world, oh, you know it!”2
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But can we feel the surge of the universe creating and destroying forms,
functioning as a justification of and consolation for the oncoming destruction
of our life, that is, of the fund of life-forces in us that contract and transform
forms? Does not Nietzsche’s vision of the Eternal Return, that new version of
the Dionysian ontology, announced in The Gay Science, indicate that the
earlier solution was unsatisfactory?
Nietzsche will now propose that in fact all the forms that are destroyed —
including the form of our lives — will be recreated. While the force of the
universe is immense and the number of forms it creates are countless, still,
Nietzsche argues, they are not infinite. But since time is infinite, the universe
can only recycle the forms it creates, and our lives with them. This doctrine
satisfied Nietzsche in that it abolishes all finality and purposes in the universe,
and thus he recognizes it to be scientific. But since now nothing is destroyed,
does it not also abolish the tragic as such?
The Gay Science presents this doctrine as a vision, an Apollonian vision
born in a moment of ecstasy. It would indeed justify each moment of this
terrestrial life we have to live as having an infinite depth and infinite worth.
But Nietzsche also convinced himself that it was true, it was the most scientific
doctrine. But if it is an illusion, as David Allison thinks,3 then is it not an
illusory justification?
In his discussion of The Gay Science, David Allison especially elaborates
the Nietzschean atheism. The death of faith, the death of God merits
celebration and not mourning, for God had functioned to inflict shame on
human life and render humans servile.
Fear, our fear, Nietzsche declares, produced God. The fearless heros of the
present age set fire to Walhalla, making themselves divine. In the ashes God
is found to be nothing.
But the unicity of God was in fact an illusion, a pretension, of the God of
monotheism. There have been many gods arising before humans in the course
of their long history. Let us only consider two of them, the ones Nietzsche did
not cease to revere: Apollo and Dionysos.
Apollo is “this deep consciousness of nature, healing and helping in sleep
and dreams”;4 Nietzsche makes the power to dream in us a divine force. The
power to see what is not there is not a power of the conscious ego and is not
launched by any act of our own will. It is instead the force of Nature in our
nature. “The subject, the willing individual that furthers his own egoistic ends,
can be conceived of only as the antagonist, not as the origin of art. Insofar as
the subject is the artist, however, he has already been released from his
individual will, and has become, as it were, the medium through which the one
truly existent subject celebrates his release in appearance.” (BT 5)
Similarly, neither music which conveys no instruction nor dance where
music launches the body into a movement without term, are initiatives of
conscious intentions. They are instances in us of the periodicity of Nature: “‘O
Zarathustra,’ the animals said, ‘to those who think as we do all things
themselves are dancing!’” (Z III, The Convalescent 2). Indeed, the Dionysian
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force “seeks to destroy the individual and redeem him by a mystic feeling of
oneness.” (BT 2)
One can to be sure say that the anthropomorphic forms these forces of
nature assume is produced by humans — and David Allison traces the
successive guises that they took on until in the climax period of Greek
antiquity they acquired the names and anthropomorphic forms of Apollo and
Dionysos. But can we say that these forms were fabricated by human
contrivance, as David Allison, following the explanations in The Gay Science
and The Genealogy of Morals, says of the Judeo-Christian God? Should we
not rather say that these figures were themselves Apollonian forms, apparitions
produced by the creative force of Nature in which we participate when we
dream and when we are possessed by music and dance?
Nietzsche’s declamation “God is dead” can indeed be taken as the simple
formulation of an atheist positivism, and no doubt Nietzsche’s polemic often
induced him to formulate it in that sense. But it seems to be that instead of
taking it simply equivalent to: God does not exist, or: God is a mendacious
fiction fabricated by servile humans, we should be attentive to the term “dead”:
this figure of supreme life was, Nietzsche argues, the hypostasized image of
death. God dead on the cross functioned to mortify the instincts and drives and
sensuality that are the very substance of human life. God is the form that death
took on in human history. But beneath that form is a reality: the force of death
itself. God — this Judeo-Christian god, this moral and punitive god — then is
not simply a fiction created by fear to be dissipated by the critical mind; he is
to be combated.
The combat with the Judeo-Christian god participates in and is driven by a
force greater than any divinized human, any fearless Siegfried: a force at loose
in Nature, which force is Dionysos. “Have you understood: Dionysos versus
the Crucified” Nietzsche wrote in the days of his final collapse.
And is not Nietzsche himself one of the places where this combat breaks
out, because he finds in himself, quite despite himself, the compulsions of
Dionysos but also those of the Crucified?
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